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Taxation of Corporations
BECAUSE the corporate form of organization predominates in
our industrial system, a very large share of the commodities
and services which make up the national product is created
in enterprises operated by corporations. Similarly, a very
large share of the money payments by which the bulk of the
national income is distributed among individuals takes the
form of corporate disbursements. Such disbursements include
three categories of chief significance in the present analysis:
(i) wages and salaries paid to employees, ranging from un-
skilled labor to managers, for their productive services; (2)
interest paid to creditors for the use of their capital; and
dividends paid to owners for the use of their capita' and
for their assumption of the risks of enterprise. For numerous
corporations, some disbursements in the second. and third
categories go to other corporations and therefore do not con-
stitute a direct distribution of national income among indi-
viduals. But the bulk of corporate dividend and interest pay-
ments goes to individuals directly or reaches their possession
indirectly through savings banks and other financial institu-
tions. Manifestly, practically all disbursements of the first
category, wages and salaries, go directly to individuals.
Chapters and 4 show, the main danger of an inflationary
price advance arises because total civilian money incomes are
likely to exceed greatly, during the war, the total value at
constant prices of goods available for civilian purchase. While
corporations spend a large share of the aggregate net income
of civilians, the main share is spent by individuals from their
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income.A tax policy designed to combat inflation will there-
fore include provisions intended to restrict the income avail-
able for individual purchases. Various elements of the tax
system, existing or contemplated, contribute to this end.
Whatever the other tax devices possibly appropriate to this
end, taxes on corporations are in some quarters regarded as
peculiarly appropriate because they may be designed to re-
duce income, or prevent its expansion, before it reaches in-
dividuals.
In a practical sense, the possibilities in this direction are
not as numerous as might be implied by listing the three
main categories of corporate disbursements to individuals. A
tax levied upon a corporation is unlikely to reduce, or pre-
vent expansion of, its payments in the form of wages and
salaries or of interest. A tax on corporate gross receipts, like
an excise (see Ch. 9), tends to be shifted to buyers of cor-
porate through higher prices. A tax on corporate
profits is unlikely to restrict or reduce wage or interest pay-
ments in the short run period, such as would probably include
the duration of a war, so long as that tax can be met amply
Out of profits. If the tax is very severe, however, it may tend
to restrict wage or interest payments by making the expecta-
tion of gain (profit after taxes) so small in view of the risks
that corporate management will refrain from employing
labor and borrowing working capital to expand operations.
Even such a severe tax is unlikely to restrict wage payments
through a limitation of wage rates, for the labor market for
management personnel, skilled labor, and perhaps unskilled
labor is so tight that increases in wage rates are not easily
resisted.'
A dominant aim of the war effort is to increase output, and
public policy is unlikely to favor corporation taxes so severe
as to restrict compensation of employees or payments of iii-
terest through limitation of new or expanded undertakings.
Accordingly, the one important category of disbursements to
individuals that taxes on corporations can practically be de-i88 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
signed to restrict is the third, dividends. The possibilities of
limiting, by means of corporation taxes, dividends to individ-
uals, and therefore of limiting for those individuals who are
dividend receivers the incomes available for use in civilian
purchases, are very great: if corporate taxes were so severe
as to prevent all dividend payments, the reduction in indi-
vidual incomes would reach several billion dollars (even in
1939 net dividend payments were about $3.8 billion).2 In
actual practice, corporation taxes are unlikely to be so severe
as to prevent all dividend payments, and a substantial fraction
of corporate profits flows to individuals in the form of divi-
dends. These dividends then become part of the taxable
income of individuals, and on the average bear a high rate of
individual income tax. This part of the income of such in-
dividuals is accordingly subject to double taxation and under
the present law at high rates, once as net income in the hands
of the corporation and once as income received by the in-
dividual. No other type of individual income is subject to
two such heavy taxes, and this condition explains the fre-
quent protest that the existing tax law discriminates heavily
against individual.s who own the equity capital of corporations.
Further increases in tax rates on corporate profits will empha-
size this discrimination.
In terms of the needs of the situation, as developed in
Chapter 3, the fact that taxes on corporations can feasibly
restrict in important degree only such incomes flowing to in-
dividuals as take the form of dividends is somewhat unfor-
tunate. Dividends, unlike wages of labor and to a less extent
compensation of managers and perhaps interest on corporate
debt, go chiefly to individuals having large and middle bracket
incomes rather than to those in the lower brackets. Chapter
•3 shows that one of themain points of inflationary danger is
in the middle range of the income scale, $1,75o-lo,000, the
total excess of purchasing power being considerably smaller
at the top. Restriction of dividends through corporation taxes
is not precisely adapted to meeting the chief need mentionedTAXATION OF CORPORATIONS 189
inChapter 3, although it would certainly contribute toward
meeting the needs there set forth.
Direct taxes on corporations reduce or restrict the incomes
of dividend recipients, out of which they might make civilian
purchases, as well as absorb corporate income that might not be
disti-ibuted as dividends but might instead remain in the pos-
session of corporations and be spent for civilian goods.8 In both
respects, then, corporation taxes limit purchasing power for
civilian goods, and the possible limitation is very gTeat, reach-
ing at its maximum the total net earnings of taxable corpora-
tions. For various practical reasons, the feasible absorption
of civilian money incomes through corporation taxes falls
short of total net earnings, after wage and interest payments
and all other costs, of the corporate system; and, for various
reasons of public policy, it may fall far short. Nevertheless,
a very large part, perhaps nearly the entire wartime expan-
sion in corporate net earnings, and the corresponding expan-
sion in incomes of dividend recipients and of the retained
income of corporations themselves, could be absorbed by a
set of corporation taxes designed. for this purpose. Much of
the discussion belOw is directed to these possibilities.
First, however, we note that certain other taxes can be de-
signed to limit employee compensation and interest pay-
ments and these other taxes are of the stoppage-at-the-source
type (see Gb. ii and 12). Although these are not taxes on
corporations, corporations may be made the agents of the
Treasury for their collection.
1 EXISTING CORPORATE TAXES
Taxes on corporations have already come to be the largest
revenue producers in the federal tax system. The policy of
Congress is clearly to use them extensively in the current
emergency, and strong pressure exists for their conversion
into the primary weapon of war finance. The weight of this
pressure, the existence of a policy which satisfies in consider-
able degree the objective laid down, and the, potential yield190 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
of the taxes involved, warrant detailed consideration of a
program of this sort.
The weapons that would probably be the bulwark of such
a program already existed at the end of 1940. The tax system
then in force included a long list of taxes on corporations,
most of which can be neglected in the present connection.
Three are simply devices intended to assist in enforcing the
taxes imposed on personal incomes.4 Three provide special
formulae for applying the basic corporation income tax to
particular cases,5 and two impose levies on unusual revenues
which appear under certain narrowly defined circumstances.6
Of the other four taxes two are of overwhelming importance,
the tax on corporate net income and the levy on excess profits
which was established by the Second Revenue Act of 1940.
Far less important are the capital stock and declared-value
excess profits taxes. Enacted to assist in financing the National
Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, they have continued as a
part of the federal revenue system in the face of vigorous pro-
test. The opposition is readily understood upon even a cursory
examination of the Act. One imposes a rate of $1.25 per thou-
sand on the value of capital stock, but no attempt is really
made to evaluate capital stock for this purpose. The state-
ment of the taxpayer corporation concerning the amount of
this item is accepted as final. The reasonableness of the state-
ments is supposed to be assured by the second tax. Excess
profits are calculated as a rate of return upon the declared
value of capital stock used in the first measure.7 The dilemma
which confronts the taxpayer is largely responsible for the un-
popularity of the declared-value taxes. If, in choosing the
declared value, the corporation attempts to lighten the bur-
den under one of these taxes it automatically incurs heavier
liabilities under the other. The Treasury has recommended
that this pair of taxes be repealed in 1942, and that the loss
of revenue be made up through other corporate laxes.
The logical justification for them must run in terms of a
payment for the privilege of doing business in the corporateTAXATION OF CORPORATIONS 191
form, but the connection between it and the bases used in
these taxes is extremely remote. This, together with their
relatively small yield,8 their unpopularity, and the fact that
they are characterized by a type of shrewdness beneath the
dignity of a powerful government makes it doubtful that
they could properly be elaborated to provide additional rev-
enues for financing war. Hence the role of corporation taxes
in a revenue program for the immediate future must be dis-
cussed primarily in terms of a levy on corporate net income,
the excess profits tax introduced in 1940, and any new vari-
eties of business taxation that can de developed to meet the
needs of the existing emergency.
Tax on Corporate Net Income
The tax on corporate net income is the basic element in the
entire existing structure. Set up in 1909 as a prelude to the
enactment of a tax on personal income, it was carried over
into the legislation of 1913 as an instrument for collecting at
the source the normal tax upon the portion of individual
income received as dividends, as well as the portion of cor-
porate earnings left undistributed. As time went on, however,
the sharp divergence between the rate on personal income
and on corporate net income indicated that the tax on the lat-
ter was coming to be more and more a tax on corporate enter-
prise itself rather than a collection device to enforce the levy
on personal income. This transition was thrown into sharp
relief in 1936whencorporate dividends were for the first
time included in the personal net income subject to normal
tax. Congress was probably influenced to introduce the first
significant divergence between the rate on corporate income
and the normal rate on personal income because it recognized
that failure to distribute corporate earnings offered a means
of avoiding taxes, by all stockholders,° even though many
stockholders intended no avoidance and were perhaps un-
aware of it. Another factor which has perhaps often favored•
advances in the rate is the ease, from a political and legisla-192 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
tive viewpoint, with which a new demand upon corporate
income can be made. In any case, once different rates had
been set, restoration of the original relationship could never
be easy. The historical development can be rationalized after
the fact in logical terms by saying that the present corporate
net income tax has come to be a special payment in return
for the privilege of carrying on business within the framework
of the laws and services provided by the federal government.
These benefits are now taxed, however, only when enjoyed by
a group of enterprisers operating as a corporate body. Part-
nerships and individual enterprises are subject to neither this
nor other federal taxes imposed on corporations.
Under the legislation of 1940 the rates ranged from 14.85
per cent on corporate net income up to $5,000 to 24 per cent
on that above $25,000. The yield for the fiscal year 1941
was $1.9 billion, the largest single item in federal revenues.
The legislation of 1941raisedthe effective rate to approxi-
mately 31 per cent for corporations having net incomes over
$25,000. The form this raise took, the application of a surtax
instead of a simple change in the normal rates, was shaped by
a desire to avoid a premium that would otherwise accrue to
corporate holders of certain federal securities exempt from
the normal tax on corporations under the terms of the bond
contract. The expected yield from the corporate net income
tax as so altered for the fiscal year 1943is$3.5 billion. It is
higher than for preceding years both because of the rates and
other provisions established by the Act of 1941 and because
of the expansion of national income and the advance in prices.
Tax on Excess Profits
The second of the two major elements in the corporate tax
system, the levy on excess profits enacted in 1940(notto be
confused with the declared-value excess profits tax mentioned
above), is of an entirely different nature. It marks an attempt
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sense or another are unusually large. They may be purely
windfall gains depending on changing market conditions, or
generally high profits based upon monopoly position, superior
equipment, or managerial skill, or they may be earnings
which are associated with some unusual occurrence such as
the receipt of munitions orders or the mere existence of a
war boom. Although it is by no means easy to single out
one or more of these several varieties of unusual earnings for
taxation, something can be done and the type of profits at
which the tax is aimed will determine very largely the de-
tails of the legislation.
The excess profits tax has struck primarily at the fairly
general increase in earnings resulting from the armament
boom rather than the profits of munitions manufacturers as
such on the one hand or generally high profits, which are
presumably largely influenced by monopoly position, on the
other. This conclusion is not at all self-evident from an in-
spection of the law itself; for, although the law is clearly
broader in its scope than a tax on munitions profits would be,
the prospective taxpayer is offered a choice between one
formula, which is associated with the taxation of wartime
profits, and a second, which is commonly used when high
profits generally are the object of the legislation. The manner
in which taxpayers have exercised their option, however,
warrants the conclusion that this tax operates in fact as if it
were imposed primarily upon wartime proftts perSe.
Atax aimed at the latter is ordinarily applied to the addi-
tional earnings which appear during the war and are above
those present in a selected prewar period. The present federal
levy permits the taxpayer corporation to caicilate net income
for excess profits tax purposes by comparing current earnings
and those which result from the application of an extremely
complex formula constructed around the income actually
earned during Thesefour years are known as the
'base period', and this method of calculation, as the194 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
period income' formula. A levy built on these lines alone
would be recognized immediately as a 'war profits' tax. Al-
though it would not trench greatly upon unusually high
profits due to monopoly position or long-standing superior
management, it would strike at all wartime increases in
profits, including windfalls not due to the war boom.
But the 1941 statute also permits the taxpayer to compute
excess profits net income by a second and very different
formula: invested capital method. compute 'cx-
by comparing current earnings with an amount
which is roughly cent on the investmentpeculiarly
in the An excess of this
sort may appear because of a war boom, a windfall or unusual
conditions of some other nature, or a monopoly situation or
other competitive advantage that produces currently an un-
usually high yield on the investment.
About two-thirds of the firms reporting in the year follow-
ing enactment of the statute chose the base period income
rather than the invested capital method, and those applying
the latter reported only one-fifth of the total excess profits
upon which the tax was based.1° The conclusion can be
drawn that the legislation of 1940 set up an excess profits
tax which turned out in practice to be primarily a levy on
wartime profits. Firms which had unusually low earnings
during the base period or which are not old enough to possess
the evidence upon which base period income might be cal-
culated chose the alternative method.
Under the Act of 1940 excess profits as calculated by the
formula the ent,erprise chose were subjected to a rate sched-
ule ranging from 25 to 50 per cent; under the Act of 1941
the rates range from 35 to 6o per cent. The range in rates
is not based upon the relation between earnings and assets,
as one might expect in a tax of this sort, but upon the ab-
solute excess profits, the maximum rate applying to the
amount over $500,000. The estimated yield from this tax for
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2 POSSIBLE CHANGES IN CORPORATE TAXES
As noted above, the group of corporation taxes as a whole
is playing a major role in financing the armament program.
The estimated yield under the Act of 1941forthe entire
group of corporate taxes for the fiscal year ending June 1943
is $6.7 billion, which accounts for 38 per cent of the revenue
produced by the entire federal tax program. In contrast, the
yield from corporation taxes in the fiscal year ended June
1939, the last before the actual outbreak of hostilities in
Europe, was $1.3billion,which was oniy 23 per cent of the
total tax revenue collected by the federal government in that
year.
Nevertheless, this growth in the relative contribution of
corporation taxes has not prevented prominent individuals
and organizations from noting that corporate profits before
taxes have expanded more rapidly than national income.
Expressing intense dissatisfaction with current policies, they
urge that taxes on corporations be raised substantially, fre-
quently supporting their position by pointing out the rela-
tively more prominent role these taxes played in federal
finance during World War L11 A set of basic issues presents
itself for consideration. One concerns the form of the excess
profits tax: is it to be continued as predominantly a war
profits tax or is it to be converted into a tax on high profits
generally? At the hearings on the Revenue Bill of 1941the
Treasury made a determined effort to eliminate the option
to compute excess profits by the base period income method.
This change would have meant the conversion of a de facto
war profits tax into a levy on high profits generally, but it
failed.
Another basic issue concerns the rates imposed under the
excess profits tax: will the additional revenue yielded under
the 1941 rates because of expanding national income and ris-
ing prices be sufficient, or should the rates be advanced still
further? If the rates are advanced, should they be designed196 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
to maintain corporation taxes, i.e., the excess profits tax to-
gether with the tax on corporate net income and other cor-
porate levies, in their present percentage position in the
revenue system, or should their relative importance be in-
creased or decreased?
Before examining these questions, we note the presump-
tion favoring the continuance of the two major elements i.n
the corporate tax structure. The fundamental objective of
war finance, namely, to curtail civilian spending, is discussed
above in its bearing on corporation taxes. If new attempts to
promote social reform of a broad character through taxation
are relegated by the government to a minor role for the dura-
tion, continuance of existing taxes, so long as they do not
interfere drastically with the regulation of a wartime econ-
omy, is the natural and easy course, and changes are likely
to be determined mainly by their contribution to such reg-
ulation.
The levy on corporate net income has the sanction of long
usage and is constructed on the base best calculated to throw
the main burden upon the shareholders whom most citizens
regard as the primary recipients of the governmental benefits
supposedly justifying taxation of this sqrt. While the rates
under the Act of 1941 are relatively high, those prevailing
for several years have been substantial and business has not
only become accustomed to taxation in this form but also
probably adjusted itself largely to them. Such adjustment has
gone forward progressively, and the raising of large sums by
means of this tax has encountered relatively few objections.
An excess profits tax designed to tap wartime profits is
also widely commended. Indeed, if such a tax were not in
force, it would be politically desirable to impose one. 'Excess
profits' are synonymous in most citizens' minds with unneces-
sarily large profits, which in time of stress are apt to be re-
garded as the fruits of 'profiteering'. If popular acquiescence
in a war finance program is to be retained, the public must
be assured that action is being taken to keep the misfortunesTAXATION OF CORPORATIONS 197
of the nation from becoming the source of unusual gains to
particular business enterprises. An excess profits tax seems
to the public mind eminently suited to recapturing such in-
come when it does appear; and, since most people do not
raise the further question of the technique by which profits
that are 'excess' are to be separated from those which are not,
the intellectual difficulties that confront the expert who at-
tempts to construct an excess profits tax are avoided by the
ordinary citizen. Under these circumstances, popular and
legislative approval of something labeled an 'excess profits'
tax is fairly easy to obtain.
In addition to satisfying this demand on the part of the
voting public, an excess profits tax may lead to a less insistent
direction of trade union policy toward higher wage rates.
If 'excess profits' go untaxed, a much more persuasive case
can be made for general advances in wage rates. Since the
latter are highly inflationary, the case for excess profits taxa-
tion is significantly strengthened.
Finally, in any boom a great many profits accrue which are
unnecessary in the sense that they would not have to be paid
in order to get the work of a capitalist society done. This is
probably more apt to be true in a war boom than in a more
ordinary one, because during a war motives other than the
search for profits play an unusually significant role in deter-
mining business decisions. An excess profits tax may be used
to absorb much or all of these unnecessary profits.
With corporate taxation as established under the Act of
1941, the weight of the excess profits tax upon earning power
must be considered together with the burden under the net
income tax, and note must be taken of the order in which
the two taxes are computed. Much attention has recently
been given, as corporate taxes have become heavier, to the
concept of the 'marginal rate of tax': for practical purposes,
the tax on the last portion of profits actually earned, or the
tax which would apply to an additional dollar of profits.
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the highest brackets under both the excess profits and the in-
come tax provisions, the top bracket rates under the Act
of 1941 being normal tax, 24; surtax, excessprofits tax,
6o. If its earnings increased $i .oo, the corporation would
pay on that dollar 6o cents in excess profits tax; and the
remaining 40 cents would be subject to the normal tax and
surtax at 31 per cent, or 12.4 cents. The total tax on that
dollar would be 72.4 cents, and the marginal rate of tax 72.4
per cent. The net profit from that dollar after tax is 27.6
cents; and this is what the corporation would gain in com-
pensation for taking whatever risks and calling upon its
executives and other employees for whatever extra efforts
might be involved in producing the additional dollar of
'profits before taxes'. In the short run, and the short-run
effects predominate in wartime, the decisions to assume addi-
tional risks and put forth additional effort would presumably
be made in the light of this expectation as to profits after
taxes. The higher the total tax on marginal profits, the
smaller the net profit after tax from the marginal earnings; the
smaller, in other words, the final reward of the corporation
for a given effort and risk-assumption. Conceivably under
the boom conditions largely prevailing in wartime, many
enterprises may find the effort and risk incident to producing
an additional dollar of earnings smaller than in peacetime;
and, so far as this is true, less of the additional dollar may
need be left free after taxes in order to call forth the addi-
tional productive activity. Precise determination of the facts
is difficult or impossible. We emphasize merely the qualita-
tive principle: the marginal tax burden should not be so
heavy as to remove the encouragement afforded by expecta-
tion of profit after taxes to the maximum productive activity
vital to the war effort.
Since a considerable portion of the profits realized during
a boom of this sort may be unnecessary in this sense, since a
substantial levy on excess profits removes an argument union
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this form of taxation is calculated to placate the general pub-
lic's fear of 'profiteering', a case for imposing an excess profits
tax can easily be made now. Acceptance of this conclusion
brings up the form of the present levy. As pointed out above,
the tax under the Act of 1941 is in fact a levy on 'war
rather than on 'high profits'. This distinction is important,
especially since the wisdom of the choice Congress made has
been questioned repeatedly by the Treasury, which has pro-
posed the elimination of the corporation's option to use the
average prewar profits as a base for calculating excess profits
and the compulsory use by all corporations of the invested
capital base. By this seemingly technical maneuver the basic
philosophy of the existing law would be reversed, and the
law would be transformed into one taxing high profits similar
to that in force during World War I.
Although excellent authority can be brought to bear in
support of the Treasury recommendation, the proposal ad-
mits of the interpretation that the government desires to
convert the tax from a temporary wartime basis to a perma-
nent source of revenue and of business regulation, and is in
fact interpreted in this fashion in certain quarters. The
Treasury's 141 proposal, implying a tax on unusually high
profits irrespective of their source, was not pushed in the
House hearings on the 1942 revenue bill. Some profits al-
ways seem to be unusually large, even in peacetime; there-
fore, a case can always be made for a high profits tax, a
conclusion stressed by the outstanding American advocate of
this particular form of excess profits taxation.12
The main reasons which can be adduced for the proposal
to engineer this drastic shift in the nature of the present
tax are a desire to reach profits of an allegedly monopoly
character, or profits not necessary as a means of calling forth
output, and to tax more effectively enterprises that had un-
usually high earnings during the base income period used
under the present law. The chief economic objection to the
proposed shift in the type of tax is the difficulty encountered200 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
in distinguishing between monopoly profits, which are widely
regarded as an excellent object of special taxation, and other
high profits, which must be permitted in many cases in order
to get the work of a capitalist society done. An excess profits
tax constructed along the lines of the Treasury's 1941 recom-
mendation would boil down to a levy on incomes in excess
of a more or less arbitrarily chosen rate of return on a more
or less arbitrarily defined capital investment. Very real danger
exists that a levy of this sort would strike at the payments
necessary to call forth business enterprise, especially the form
of enterprise that represents a gamble against fairly long odds,
although war-order business may, in numerous cases, be free
from some of the risks ordinary enterprise runs.
Moreover, while a case might be made for a special attack
on monopoly profits, if they could be recognized and deter-
mined, during more normal times, certain economic and po-
litical can be advanced against attempting
such action during, the emergency. The proposal to levy a
tax on 'high profits' perse willarouse opposition that is not
present when the measure in question is apparently aimed
merely at the unusual gains arising during a war boom. A tax
of the latter sort not only seems less likely to touch on socially
necessary payments but also may reasonably be expected to
vanish with the boom conditions that explain its existence.
The fact that the excess profits tax, a 'high profits' tax, of
World War I was repealed in the early 'twenties may not
inspire confidence that a similar law would be repealed after
this war. Hence business men probably react less violently
to a levy of the 'war profits' type than to a tax on high incomes
the logic of which leads to an expectation that it will become
a permanent feature of the federal tax system. Since the
wholehearted cooperation of business is vital during a na-
tional emergency, a strong argument based on both political
and economic grounds can be made to continue the excess
profits tax in its present form. Congress has recognized this
in rejecting the Treasury's suggestion, pressed especially dur-TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS 201
ing the 1941 hearings, that the option to calculate excess
profits by the base period income formula be withdrawn.
This argument does not mean that the present law is per-
fect, nor does it support the base period income as the sole
appropriate method of calculating excess profits. It can be
argued to excellent effect that this technique is in any event
incomplete and will of necessity be replaced by the invested
capital method if the tax is long retained in its present form.
Changes in the capital used in a business subsequent to the
years which form the basis for the comparison between net in-
comes would require a corresponding alteration in the cal-
culation of normal and excess earnings if substantial and
illogical discrimination among firms were to be avoided. The
lengthening of the interval between the base period and
current earnings would increase the number of companies
which choose to cailculate normal profits in terms of invested
capital, and a distinct tendency would exist, through exercise
of the option, for the latter to supplant base period earnings
as a method of calculating normal profits. Therefore, unless
the base period itself is altered, any reasonably constructed
excess profits tax (on excess over base period earnings) will,
if the option is permitted, tend to become a high profits tax
(on excess above normal return on invested capital) over a
long period. However, many years would have to elapse be-
fore this automatic conversion would be fully or even largely
achieved. From the foregoing argument comes a strong case
for correcting the base period income for changes in invested
capital and this is in fact done under the present statute.
The troublesome question of incentives, troublesome be-
cause its solution involves a balancing among the attitudes
of various groups in the community, arises in connection with
the form of the excess profits tax. If no excess profits tax
existed in wartime, the damage to the incentives of most in-
dividuals, including many business men, might easily be so
great as to outweigh any possible stimulus, through absence
of restriction on the rate of profit, to such business men as202 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
might be in a position to share in the enlarged earnings of
especially favored corporations; and the war effort might
accordingly be seriously impaired. But, once the excess profits
tax exists, failure to give it the form of a high profits tax will
probably not greatly weaken incentives of individuals in
general, although a few may be disappointed because the war
is not used as an occasion for achieving what they regard as
a long run reform in governmental control over the dis-
tribution of industrial rewards. On the other hand, giving
the tax the form of a high profits tax would probably work
havoc on the incentives of many business men, including
some not in a position to share in war profits. They may see
in such a tax a promise of a policy to be retained after the
war, and fear accordingly that the peacetime tax system will
limit or prevent the high rates of earnings which encourage
them to take the business gamble against loss. Such high rates
are by no means common among enterprises, and are rarely
for long intervals; instead they are usually Un-
Lexpected,
but the chancethatthey may be realized is one of
the most powerful factors in calling forth management effort.
This chance, that successful management may occasionally
demonstrate its capacity by reporting high profits while the
mass of managers succeed in reporting merely moderate
profits or report losses, is an essential element of the free
enterprise system.
The present law also departs from a pure added profits tax
in order to avoid the discriminatory burdens the latter would
impose on firms whose earnings during the base period were
unusually low; for instance, because a depression affected
their industry or area but was not general.13 Such cases are
covered by the option to use the invested capital method, and
this relief recognizes that no period can be 'normal' for all
industry.14
As a matter of fact, only one major logical gap appears in
the excess profits provisions of the present law. A corporation
that has made high, perhaps unusually high profits, duringTAXATION OF CORPORATIONS 203
the base period may escape to a substantial degree from the
scope of the excess profits tax under the current option to
compute by the base period income method. This is unfortu-
nate if, in view of the arguments of preceding paragraphs,
such high profits are in truth economically unnecessary, and
the exclusive use of the invested' capital method would ad-.
mittedly remedy this defect. Many of these cases of high base
period profits probably do not exist, because 1936—39,which
now constitutes the base period, was in general a period of
low or moderate corporate earnings.
Nevertheless, political pressure to bring these favored cor-
porations more effectively under the excess profits tax may
lead to consideration of some compromise device accom-
plishing at least part of this objective. The suggestion has
been made that a practical means would be to require every
corporation to calculate its excess profits on both the average
base period earnings and the invested capital formulas, and
compute the tax on the average of the two. A plan of this
sort dodges the theoretical issues, treating the matter merely
as one in which, as neither solution is recognized to have been
convincingly established, a straight average may prove more
equitable than a rigid insistence on either and would at the
same time remove an option the taxpayer corporation would
naturally choose to its advantage.
The mass of technical problems arising in the construction,
administration, collection, and payment of an excess profits
tax need not be mentioned here. However, as it is common
knowledge that they are unusually acute as compared with,
say, a tax on corporate net income, a presumption is set up
in favor of the latter in raising additional revenue from
cOrporations. This is especially true in view of the axiomatic
proposition that in taxation administrative difficulties and
rates tend to increase together.
The foregoing indicates that to continue the main elements
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but the expansion of these measures in order to increase
the total yield of corporation taxes raises a troublesome issue
concerning the balance among the various elements of the
entire tax structure.*
* COMMENT BY A MEMBER OF THE CONFERENCE ON RESEARCH IN FISCAL
In saying that "the continuance of the main elements of the existing system
of corporation taxes is easy to accept" and in commenting on some defects
of that system, it seems to me that the Committee should not have ignored
the illeffects of the present treatment of borrowed capital and interest
thereon, and the lack of integration between the personal and corporation
income taxes.
Profits of an enterprise conducted by a corporation, if distributed as in-
terest, are taxed once—to the bondholders. Those distributed as dividends
are taxed twice—first, to the corporation on the gross sum out of which
dividends must come, and then to the stockholders on the remnant they re-
ceive. This system puts a premium on debt financing, which becomes greater
as tax rates increase and is now almost compelling.
The absurdity of the system is illustrated by the fact that under the law
now in force it is often possible for companies to increase their net income
after taxes by borrowing, even if the proceeds produce no income. Again,
one of the major benefits from incorporation is limitation of liability; yet
the more this privilege is availed of, the smaller becomes the excise tax levied
on business conducted in corporate form. In such ways unsound capital
structures are encouraged, with the result that later a demand for special
relief to debt-ridden companies is created which as a practical matter cannot
be ignored, and further discrimination against sound finance results.
It is a strange commentary on our system of Government that the Inter-
state Commerce Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commission
should under the direction of Congress be engaged in efforts to improve the
capital structure of corporations by the creation of equity capital and the
reduction of debt, and at the same time the Treasury, which shQuld be even
more interested in this objective, should be following a policy which must
discourage or penalize its attainment.
Surely none who are studying the problems of the war or the post-war
period can fail to be gravely concerned over the effects of the present policy.
The manner of dealing with it would require careful study. The English
scheme suggests one solution. If a less radical change is sought, it would
probably be desirable to deal differently with various classes of companies,
such as railroads, utilities, finance companies, real estate companies, et cetera,
and also to make distinctions between companies whose securities are widely
distributed, those closely held, and pure holding companies. The treatment
of corporations as homogeneous for the purpose of an excise tax not in-
tegrated with the personal tax has long seemed to me illogical and unsound.
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From the viewpoint of a principal objective of a war finance
program, to curtail consumer incomes, these taxes are seri-
ousiy deficient in several respects. As noted above, levies on
corporate net income and excess profits by themselves fail
to reach the bulk of consumer income, which is received in
the form of wages and salaries. They are concentrated upon
the types of income from which relatively large percentages
are saved. Moreover, if this unfortunate limitation of cor-
porate taxes is avoided by shifting the basis from net incothe
to gross receipts, the economic effects will be changed from
those associated with a levy falling primarily on shareholders
to those obtained under a general tax on sales. The main
arguments concerning the sales tax, and suggestions of better
ways to reduce consumer spending, the basic task, are set
forth in Chapter 9. Another defect of the present corporate
taxes is their failure to reach even business income generally.
Their expansion means greater discrimination in favor of
such unincorporated business as is not owned by high bracket
individual taxpayers, and fails to reach incomes of unin-
corporated business which also tend to increase consumer
spending.
Despite these defects, large additional revenue will proba-
bly be raised from the taxes. The chief reason
is political and springs from the logic that makes the appear-
ance of an excess profits tax inevitable during a war: the war
incentives of the mass of citizens are likely to be injured if
they believe or suspect that an inadequate share of the total
burden is laid upon corporations which seem to profit from
the war. When a large contribution is being demanded from
the lower income classes, especially when the taxes imposed
on wages themselves are increased (e.g., in the social security
system it is proposed to increase the levies on payrolls), it
will be extremely difficultif not impossible to head off
further business taxes which are presumed to fall primarily
on the middle and upper income brackets. Moreover, this
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excess profits rather than on corporate net income, despite
the relative administrative advantages in the latter tax, for
excess profits are regarded by the public as reflecting largely
advantages gained from exploiting the necessity of the nation.
The basic practical question of policy concerns, in fact,
the direction in which the new burdens will be imposed.
Should the additional revenue to be raised through corporate
taxes be from the levy on corporate net income or on excess
profits? 15Asnoted above, the former has a great advantage
from an administrative viewpoint. Although 'net income' is
difficult enough to define, 'excess profits' are even more vague,
a fact which complicates the task of those who draft as well
as those, in enterprises and in government, who attempt to
interpret the legislation. In addition, the levy on corporate
net income has a substantially broader scope in that it would
reach the incomes of more corporations, and hence would be
a better, though far from perfectly effective, instrument for
reducing private spending. Hence, a presumption is in favor
of the net income tax as the source of most of the additional
revenue corporation taxes may be called upon to produce.
On the other hand, excess profits taxation seems to very many
citizens more equitable in the present circumstances, and
is far more salable from a political point of view.
If political pressure and economic reasons favoring excess
profits taxation are so strong that a more severe application
is undertaken, an advance in the rates and a tightening up
of the detail.s of the present law seem capable of increasing
substantially the yield. Two suggestions are calculated to
mitigate somewhat the unfortunate consequences of an un-
duly severe levy on excess profits. One is the device used in
Great Britain during World War I of imposing a tax on
the average income of several years. When the war ends
and losses take the place of excess profits in some instances,
a moving average will bring a revision of the tax due, and
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scheme is easy to justify from the viewpoint of both equity
and fiscal policy. But it is so cumbersome from an adminis-
trative viewpoint, and invites so much public hostility to
frequent and perhaps large tax refunds, that it does not seem
feasible for the United States. An alternative is to levy a
portion of the tax due in the form of blocked accounts or to
collect a forced loan evidenced by nontransferable govern-
ment securities.16 This, like the averaging device, would con-
tribute to greater equity and would reduce the depressing
effect on business initiative that rates of 70 per cent or higher
are almost certain to exert.17
Finally, note may be taken of the suggestion that the ex-
cess profits tax on corporations be supplemented by a levy
which falls on the additions that appear during the war in
other types of income.18 The incomes of numerous unin-
corporated businesses, as well as of individuals, such as earn-
ings from personal services or rents, may expand with the
war boom and are sometimes as therefore including
an element of 'excess earnings'. If a tax of this sort were im-
posed, a main objection—that excess profits taxation reaches
merely a small fraction of the incomes enlarged by the war
effort—to heavy reliance on corporate taxation would dis-
appear, for such a tax would strike enlarged consumer in-
comes on a wide front. Moreover, such a tax on the incre-
ment in earnings of an individual would probably be less
burdensome to taxpayers than an equally productive tax on
individual income in general. Attractive as this suggestion
is at first glance, the administrative task raises serious doubts
concerning its wisdom, because the 'added income' tax re-
quires a comparison between wartime and prewar incomes
of individuals rather than of corporations, and because most
individuals were excluded from our federal income tax
before this war. Moreover, the arguments against the tax on
excess profits as compared with that on corporation net in-
comes can be applied here.208 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
3 REVENUE YIELD OF ILLUSTRATIVE RATE CHANGES
If we are driven to the conclusion that political and economic
reasons force additional corporate taxation, what further
revenue can be expected? If we look to Great Britain for a
precedent, we find a 50 per cent rate on corporate net in-
come, with, however, a corresponding offset against indi-
vidual income tax, and ioo per cent rate on excess profits,
one-fifth of the latter to be rebated under certain conditions
after the war.
The logic of the above considerations runs counter to
such high rates. Extremely heavy taxes on corporate earnings
have too small a scope to achieve the essential curtailment of
general civilian purchasing, and may cripple the vital war
incentives of business men. Moreover, any sudden and heavy
addition to the tax burden, whether in the whole system of
taxes or in one type such as taxes on corporations, might so
exaggerate the economic difficulties of adaptation to new
burdens that the advantages of the heavier levies would be
partly offset. Even in the crisis of war, a too swift increase
in tax burdens may defeat its purpose.
Under the 1941 law, the excess profits tax, with bracket
rates of 35 to 6o per cent, is estimated to yield $2.7 billion
for the fiscal year 1943. The corporate income tax, including
normal tax bracket rates of 15 to iper cent for corporations
with net incomes not exceeding $25,000 and a flat rate of 24
per cent for other corporations, and including a surtax with
bracket rates of 6 and 7 per cent, is estimated to yield $3.5
billion. In view of these expectations, the main factors which,
together with the rates imposed, determine the yield of the
taxes may be estimated approximately as follows (in billions
of dollars): net income of corporations having taxable in-
come, 13.7; excess profits credit, 8.3; income subject to excess
profits tax, 5.4. These rough estimates are for a full business
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due, is deducted from the net income before the rates for
the normal tax and the surtax are applied.
Let us next consider possible yields from the application
to the above basic figures of various flat rates, selected here
for illustration of the possibilities, not as suggestions concern-
ing the appropriate rates to be adopted, for the excess profits
tax, the normal tax, and the surtax. Flat rates are used
throughout because the computations are simpler, and in-
deed could not be made without supplementing the above
basic figures by figures on the number of corporations having
net incomes, of various sizes (separately shown for the excess
profits tax and the income tax computations)—information
which is not available and could be estimated only by elabo-
rate calculations.
Whether the rates should be flat or graduated is a contro-
versial question of policy. Under the Act of 1941 all three sets
of rates—the normal tax, the surtax, and the excess profits tax
—were graduated. The graduation of the two elements (nor-
mal tax and surtax) of the corporate income tax applies only
for very small net incomes, those not exceeding $25,000;
and may perhaps be fairly regarded as designed to grant tax
concessions to 'small' corporations or to penalize 'large' cor-
porations. Whatever may be said concerning the wisdom of
such a grant—such as that the government wishes to offer a
special incentive, in the form of a higher rate of profit after
tax, to small enterprises, or wishes to protect small enterprises
from financial embarrassment—the present law is not pre-
cisely fitted to such a purpose. A different argument some-
times advanced in favor of graduating the corporate income
tax is that it imposes the tax burden in accordance with
'ability to pay'. While the so-called principle of ability to pay
is widely recognized as the basis for imposing graduated taxes
on individual incomes, the same reasoning can by no means
be carried over to taxation of corporations. The 'ability' of
a corporation to pay taxes or to make any other expenditures
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also by its size and various other factors. For example, a small
corporation with a net income of $50,000 may be more 'able'
to pay a tax of $2o,ooo than a larger corporation with a net
income of $100,000.
The reasoning concerning the graduation of the excess
profits tax according to the amount of such profits is similar,
though the 1941 Act carries the graduation to a much higher
level of income ($500,000) and has a wider range of rates. The
'ability' of a corporation to pay an excess profits tax cannot
be known merely from its excess-profits net income in any
one year, but is controlled also by its size and other factors.
A tax concession for small coñipanies, if such is intended by
the lower bracket rates, is not achieved by a graduation in
terms of net income, as defined either for income tax or for
excess profits tax purposes. If consideration of the incentives
of managers or owners is decisive in the choice between grad-
uated and flat excess profits tax rates, consideration must be
given to the marginal rate of taxation, discussed above. No
clear reason appears for believing that the marginal rate can
be set higher for large companies than for small, or for com-
panies with large earnings than for those with small, if the
maximum productive activity of all enterprise is to be real-
ized.
The calculations in this chapter are based on flat rates,
because no satisfactory basis for estimating graduated rates
is available, but the revenue may be regarded as equally ob-
tainable by such scales of gTaduated rates as would be equiva-
lent to average rates identical with the flat rates here used.
This would mean, for example, that substitution of gradu-
ated rates for a flat excess profits tax rate of 6o per cent would,
in order that the revenue yield be the same, need to have a
top rate running well above and a bottom rate below 6o per
cent. As a matter of fact, preliminary and partial evidence
indicates that the graduated excess profits tax rates under the
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enue which a flat rate of about 41percent would have
yielded.
In the calculations of Table 17thenormal tax rate is taken
at its present maximum level, because the arguments which
TABLE17
Rough Estimates of Revenue from Illustrative Rates of Cor-
porate Taxes (for a full year having net income characteristics
atabout the average of 1941—42)
(allrates are percentages, money figures in millions of dollars)
SectionA
Excess profits tax, at alternative flat (or average) rates, on income (after excess
profits credit) of $5,400million,estimated as subject to excess profits tax; and
estimate of corresponding income subject to income tax, and normal tax
thereon
NORMAL TAX
EXCESS PROFITS INCOME SUBJECT REVENUE
RATE TAX REVENUE TO INCOME TAX (at24%)
6o 3,240 10,460 2,510
70 3,780 9,920 2,381
75 4,050 9,650 2,316
8o 4,320 9,380 2,251
Section 13
Surtax revenue at alternative flat (or average) rates applied to taxable income
shown in column 3 of Section A
Income subject to income tax10,460 9,920 9,650 9,380
SURTAX
RATE SURTAX REVENUE
11 1,151 1,091 1,062 1,032
i6 1,674 1,587 1,544 1,501
21 2,197 2,083 2,027 1,970
26 2,720 2,597 2,509 2,4.39
31 3,243 3,075 2,992 2,908
Section C
Totalrevenue from selected conibinations of the various alternatives, includ-
ing the normal tax of 24percent. Figures in parentheses are the percentages
of total net income, $13.7 billion, taken by taxes
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led to calling the increases in, the corporation income tax under
the Act of 1941 'surtaxes' are likely to continue to control
legislative action. The illustrative combinations of Section C
of the table show estimated revenues ranging from about $7.4
to billion,and these represent respectively 54 and 68½
per cent of the estimated total net income billion) sub-
ject to tax. Correspondingly, taxable net income after tax
ranges from $6.3 to billion.20
As already noted, these estimates are merely approximate;
because certain information essential to calculating the effects
of various tax rates is unavailable, they must be recognized
as subject to considerable margins of error. Despite their
roughness, no doubt can exist as to their relative magnitudes.
The highest revenue figure in Section C represents an in-
crease, over revenue estimated for the fiscal year 1943 under
the 1941 Act, of about $3.2 billion.
The percentages in Section C indicate the severity of the
different combinations, and these degrees of severity have
some bearing, though less direct than the marginal rates, on
whether a particular combination of corporation taxes will
seriously hurt the incentives of managers and owners of cor-
porations. The balance between the excess profits and the
income tax burden also bears upon incentives: adding to the
one burden and lightening the other, while leaving total rev-
enue fixed, may weaken the incentives of one group of busi-
ness managers and investors while fortifying the incentives
of others. Moreover, the weight of the burden, or rather the
supposed lack of burden, on corporations may affect greatly
the incentives of other groups. Measures imposing corpora-
tion taxes, as well as other burdens imposed necessarily dur-
ing the war, will reflect a balancing of conflicting interests of
various groups in the community.
Although all the money figures in Table 17 are carried out
to several digits, the bases for the estimates do not warrant
any such precision, and the procedure was followed only be-
cause it shows more clearly the arithmetic involved and re-TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS 213
veals correctly the direction of change in total revenue in
passing from one combination of rates to a somewhat differ-
ent combination. For all practical purposes such final figures
CHART 7
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• as those in Section C should be stated oniy to the nearest
tenth of a billion (for example, 7.4, 7.9); even then the accu-
racy of the right-hand digit may be seriously questioned.
Column 3 of Section A is the difference between the esti-
mated base figure, $13.7 billion, and column 2. Certain pecu-
liarities of the legal provisions concerning the income and
the excess profits taxes, as well as certain other technical diffi-
culties may mean that this manner of estimating 'income
subject to income tax' is considerably in error, but the figures
are believed satisfactory for such a rough estimate as is here
being made. The revenues in Section C can be supplemented,
for various combinations of excess profits tax and surtax rates,
by reading directly from Chart 7.
NOTES
1Noteis here taken of the possibility that heavier corporation taxes might
to some extent reduce the demand, or weaken the argument supporting such
demand, for increases in rates of wages or other employee compensation. This
point is discussed below.
2 To what extent such incomes would be used for civilian purchases is open
to question; see Ch. 10.
3Whethersuch funds would in fact be spent by corporations largely to buy
civilian goods is highly doubtful under present circumstances, because goods
such as corporations purchase are in short supply and because of other re-
straints on corporate capital expansion; see Ch. 5.
4Thesurtaxes personal holding companies and on corporations im-
properly accumulating surplus, and the tax on foreign personal holding
companies.
5Thetaxes on mutual investment companies, on resident foreign corpora-
tions, and on non-resident foreign corporations.
6Thetaxes on unjust enrichment, imposed in order to recapture revenue
left in the hands of businesses acting as collection agents for the levies
formerly imposed under the AAA program, when these taxes were declared
unconstitutional, and a recapture clause, embodied in the so-called Vinson
Act of 1940, limiting profits on defense orders.
7Specificallythe rate imposed is 6.6 per cent on net income (before other
federal taxes) which is more than io but not more than 15 per cent of the
declared value, and 13.2percent on income that exceeds 15 per cent of the
declared value.
8In1941 the declared value excess profits tax produced only
the declared value capital stock tax, $167,000,000.TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS 215
9 Except those exempt from income tax, such as educational and charitable
institutions, and individuals with incomes less than the allowable deductions
and credits.
10 Testimony of John Sullivan, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, Hearings,
Senate Committee on Finance, 1941,Parti,p. 47.
11 E.g., M. S. Eccles, R. M. LaFollette, and certain C.I.O. leaders.
12CarlShoup, The Taxation of Excess Profits, Political Science Quarterly,
LV, 535-55; LVI, 84-106, 226-49.
13 For instance, the experience of the railroads, the coal industry, flour mill-
ing, mining,lumber,and, to some extent, machinery production 1936—39
(Hearings, Senate Committee on Finance, Revenue Revision of 1941,pp. 220-
32, 509, 522, 648,694, 8i6, 894).
14 The same argument implies a question concerning the wisdom of the spe-
cial 10percent levy on added income to be applied when the invested capital
method is used, which was present in the House bill in butrejected by
the Senate.
15Wegive no attention here to the effects of the change in the Act of 1941,
by which the order of computing the two taxes is altered. Computing the
excess profits tax first and the corporate net income tax on the residue of in-
come increases the yield of the first at the expense of the second, and also
has certain less obvious consequences. The arguments for or against reverting
to the former procedure are not considered here.
16Aplan of the blocked-accounts type was included in the Treasury's recom-
mendations to the Ways and Means Committee in March 1942(Hearings,
unrevised, Part i,p. 6).
17 Hicks and others, Taxation of War Wealth (Clarendon Press, Oxford, Eng-
land, 1941),Ch.I.
18 The issues involved in this form of taxation are discussed at length in
ibid., Ch. IV.
19Sucha full year is approximately the average of the calendar years 1941
and1942,taxliabilities on each of which contribute in roughly equal pro.
portions to taxes collected in the fiscal year 1943;butthis average may not
be a close approximation because of the many corporations reporting on a
fiscal (not a calendar) year basis. The figures in the text above are, moreover,
only rough estimates, because the full information upon which close esti-
mates could be made has not been published and may indeed not be avail-
able.
20 These last figures are not the amounts available for dividends and addi.
tions to surplus for taxable corporations. To get those amounts, these figures
should be raised by the receipts of tax-exempt interest and by the tax-free
portion of intercorporate dividends received by these taxable corporations as
a group from nontaxable corporations (those showing deficits in the sense of
the tax law definitions).